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ABSTRACT
The discussion about influence of PC algorithms on the theory and practice of com-
petition (anti-cartel) law has its practical justification. PC algorithms enable the 
processing of such a volume of data, plus a very quick and lasting, non-emotional 
reaction, that the underlying assumptions on which competition protection has so far 
been built cease to work. Transparency of markets ceases to foster competition and 
the market can be riddled of price competition without any hint of contact or agree-
ment that is currently considered as a cartel. The possibility of suppressing price 
competition in online trading markets cannot but provoke a reaction of the current 
competition law. The paper thus attempts to analyze this issue through a review of 
the ongoing debate. It provides information on where the current and future threats 
to competition are seen today and what recipes to tackle them are presented. It looks 
in a critical manner at the instruments that the current competition law can use for 
this purpose. It focuses exclusively on the question of pricing made by computer al-
gorithms, which may or may not fulfil the present definition of a cartel. The issue of 
abuse of a dominant position is paid attention only when it is relevant to deal with 
price collusion on oligopolistic markets. 
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1. INTRODUCTION1
According to experts working on artificial intelligence (AI) implications, the 
AI machines will be able to replace us with 50% probability „only“ in 2040-
2045.2 It is however today ś reality that robots, or more precisely the computer 
algorithms, are able to trade very efficiently instead of people, even at prices 
that are substantially higher than the competitive ones. The following text at-
tempts to analyze precisely this issue of competition protection through the 
results of the current discussion on algorithms and anti-competitive collusion. 
This debate is fuelled by responses to the seminal book of Ariel Ezrachi and 
Maurice E. Stucke Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algo-
rithm-Driven Economy, published in November 20163, as well by the OECD’s 
Round Table Algorithms and Collusion that took place in June 2017.4 The aim 
here is to provide information on where the current and future threats to com-
petition are perceived and what recipes to cope with them are being proposed. 
The following lines try to throw a critical look at the tools that the current 
competition law can use for this purpose. The focus is made exclusively on 
the question of pricing made by computer algorithms, which may or may not 
fulfil the current definition of a cartel (given in Article 101 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of EU and Section 1 of the US Sherman Act). The issue of abuse 
of dominant position is reflected only to the extent that it coincides with the is-
sue of parallel pricing as it is above all the price collusion committed by online 
trading robots that represents the field where today’s reality combines with an 
already predictable, albeit still “fantastic” future.
1  This text has been elaborated within the project of the student scientific research “Finance 
and information technology as drivers of legal regulation in the European Union countries and 
their criminal law aspects” which is realized in the years 2017 – 2019 at the Faculty of Law of 
the Charles University, SVV 260 360/2017.
2  Umělá inteligence tiká jako bomba (AI is like a ticking bomb), interview of P. Houda 
with s N. Bostrom, Lidové noviny - Česká pozice 25. 6. 2017. <https://www.pressreader.com/
czech-republic/lidove-noviny/20170624/281513636157560 >, last accessed on 12/12/2017.
3  Harvard University Press 2016. 
4  See the OECD documents available through the website < http://www.oecd.org/compe-
tition/algorithms-and-collusion.htm >, and especially OECD (2017), Algorithms and Collu-
sion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age  < www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-collu-
sion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.htm >, last accessed on 12/12/2017. 
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2. DENIAL OF OLD TRUTHS
If we stem from the widest definition of the algorithm as „a sequence of rules 
that should be performed in an exact order to carry out a certain task“5, there 
is nothing that comes to the world specifically with powerful PCs and AI. The 
new challenge lies in the fact that computer algorithms can work with a huge 
amount of data, unimaginably quickly, without interruptions, without emo-
tions, and increasingly also without human involvement. Their grasp of cer-
tain market parameters (obtainable from the Internet), their ability to evaluate 
and run a follow-up action are exaltedly referred to as “divine,” emphasizing 
the inaccessibility of similar awareness, speed, endurance and coldness for 
human beings. To illustrate the shift, it suffices to remind that thanks to the 
PC algorithm, the well-known Internet business trader Amazon performed in 
November 2012 as many as 2.5 million changes in charged prices within one 
day, while the classic Wall-Mart retail chain changed at the same time around 
50,000 prices per month.6 
The volumes and availability of processed information, the speed of response, 
the flawlessness, and the persistence of the PC algorithms all stand out from 
the experience of the world in which the antitrust was formed. There is thus 
a new challenge to its doctrinal assumptions, to the definition of major an-
ti-competitive offenses, to standards of their detection and proving. The full 
and instant knowledge, as well as a steady rational response capability, have 
always belonged among the key prerequisites for a perfect competition mod-
el. However, the empirical experience with transparency provided by online 
tools shows the opposite: perfect information for market participants does not 
necessarily lead to greater but, on the contrary, to a less intense price competi-
tion. Such effect has been witnessed by the authorities in Chile, Australia and 
Germany when they tried to display and update online the information about 
current fuel prices at petrol stations in the country. The well-intentioned ef-
fort to release motorists from the grip of overcharging local micro-monopolies 
by informing them about an alternative price available at acceptable distance 
ended up with an overall (albeit non-nationwide) increase in the price level by 
10% on average.7 
5  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
Algorithms and Collusion – Background Note by the Secretariat DAF/COMP(2017)4, June 9, 
2017, p. 6.
6  Mehra, S., K., Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 
Minnesota Law Review Vol. 100, 2016 p. 1345.  
7  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and Counter-Measures – Note by Ezrachi, A. and Stucke, M. 
E. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)25, May 31, 2017, p. 7-8. 
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The rivalry based on a competitive uncertainty has been underpinned in the-
ory by the well-known model of prisoner’s dilemma.8 Doubts about whether 
one can rely on an opponent with whom it is not possible to communicate 
directly have dictated to “every prisoner” to prefer an aggressive strategy that 
disregarded the opponent ś interests and fought him ruthlessly. Such a strategy, 
applied to prices, usually led to the downward movement of prices or occa-
sionally event to price wars that were beneficial for consumers. But as soon as 
smart machines are capable to monitor online each change in price and follow 
it quickly and precisely before the price war initiator were able to profit from 
it, the competition through the lowering of prices is quickly assessed as inef-
fective. On the other hand, the upward price movement, also shared by a “flash 
speed”, appears to be a great strategy for any vendor ś algorithm programmed 
to ensure profitability. And because PCs do not have human imperfections and 
weaknesses, they can pursue this profitable strategy without hesitation. This 
truth is evidenced by an almost anecdotal incident with the cost of an expert 
book on genetics that has climbed to US $ 23 million per copy in online sales. 
The online seller A programmed his algorithm to keep the price a few percent 
above the seller B ś price, while the seller B ordered his algorithm not to lose 
more than a slight percentage on the price of the seller A. The upper price 
limit was not set and so the price of A steadily tried to overtake the price of B, 
which, on the contrary, did not hesitate to catch up with A…9 
With price-generating algorithms, something similar can occur in every market 
in which IT can be fully exploited in pricing10 even though it does not need to be a 
narrowly oligopolistic market to which the classical antitrust usually imputed the 
ability to converge prices or (in the dictum of EU competition law) to facilitate the 
abuse of collective dominance. With the trading via PC algorithms, it is assumed 
that such a price parallelism is sustainable for 5 and 6 undertakings without the 
8  „Two accomplices locked in separate cells. Each is offered three choices by the police: (1) 
if both confess to the charges, both will be jailed for five years, (2) if only one confesses, he 
will be freed but the non-confessor will be jailed for ten years, or (3) if neither confesses, both 
will be tried for a minor offense and will be jailed for one year.“ Read more: < http://www.
businessdictionary.com/definition/prisoner-s-dilemma.html >, last accessed on 12/12/2017. 
9  The case was referred to by the EC Commissioner for competition, Margrethe Vestager in 
her speech:  Algorithms and competition pronounced at the Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference 
on Competition. Berlin March 16, 2017. For detailed information, including the pictures of the 
sellers´ webs and their price curves see  Thomas, A., Algorithmic price-fixing may be the new 
frontier of antitrust. Fideres.com, March 18, 2016.
10  For instance, two-thirds of retailers in developped economies currently use algoritms to 
track prices of their competitors and some of them also use the software to autonomously ad-
just their prices. See in Macaulay, T., Could algorithmic pricing be good for consumers? Tech-
world, July, 10 2017. <http://www.techworld.com/data/could-algorithmic-pricing-make-collu-
sion -invisible-3661103>, last acceessed on 12/12/2017. 
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need for mutual contacts let alone agreements.11 In addition, every successful in-
ternet business must strive to maximize his own network effect. Only when his 
offer becomes the first or the second click choice for a large number of internet 
users he would keep its web shop alive and profitable in a market where it is not 
difficult to enter, but where it is very difficult - because of the network effect – to 
acquire a large enough market share and persist. Major online platforms therefore 
tend to create a rather narrow oligopoly, whose instability, caused by the dynam-
ics of the Internet environment and the technological innovation can be offset by 
an easily accessible collusion. The fact that this collusion in online markets is 
easier to achieve is also confirmed by the OECD study: because of the fact that 
online trading is characterized by market transparency and frequency of interac-
tions, i.e. by factors that make collusion significantly easier.12 
The ease of online price collusions goes hand in hand with the difficulty of 
their detection. The fact that customers usually learn about an overcharge (sup-
posing that they do not analyze themselves the business model and thus could 
not discover the vendor ś algorithm) only when it amounts to a blatant price 
aberration, makes the life difficult also for competition authorities. Under the 
circumstances of the rapidly changing price levels, which in the markets with 
predominantly online trading (securities, software, music ...) do not have a 
clear and palpable benchmark, a gradual but inconsistent upward trend in pric-
es may be difficult to detect and prove.13 And when it is captured and eventu-
ally proved, decisions and sanctions are often important only for not allowing 
the offender to escape without punishment. As a rule, they come so late that 
the market is already far from looking for the news about what was distort-
ed six or eight years ago. An example of the problem is the decision (of the 
experienced and usually efficient) US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which in October 2016 penalized a high-frequency stock trader for manipulat-
ing stock exchange rates on Wall Street during 2009.14
11  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and Counter-Measures – Note by Ezrachi, A. and Stucke, M. 
E. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)25, May 31, 2017, p. 6.
12  Mordall, J. OECD Workshop Adresses Algorithms and Collusion Issues: Kluwer Competi-
tion Law Blog. July 17, 2017 <http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2017/07/17/
oecd-workshop-addresses-algorithms-collusion-issues/>, last accessed on 12/12/2017. 
13  Price collusion may be difficult to detect just for the fact that it does not need to take form 
of a unified and long maintained price. On the contrary in an algorithm-driven market a „price 
snake“ is perfectly imaginable that would twist around a slightly but inconsistently rising axis. 
This would resemble a perfect adaptation to market ś ups and downs and it would be very dif-
ficult to tell if the price at a specific moment were really above its competitive level. 
14  Deshayes, M., Les algorithmes, ont-ils pris le pouvoir? Sciences Humaines: Les grandes 
enjeux du monde contemporain. Mars-Avril 2017, p. 155. 
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3. MANY CHANCES, MANY RISKS
Naturally, the online merchants that use pricing algorithms do not deserve just 
shame. It has already been said that online markets represent a transparent, 
dynamic environment in which it is easier to enter than into markets dom-
inated by the brick and mortar retail chains. This bring the opportunity of 
meeting between such offers and demands that would have never met without 
the Internet, which gives a chance to new competition, to greater choice and 
easier consumer satisfaction. For large online business players, however, it is 
no longer possible to separate this type of trading from smart software that 
monitors the price fluctuations, the supply and the demand, the group and the 
individual customer preferences, as well as many other factors that can be im-
portant for success in trading. Thus, on the one hand, the environment of the 
digital economy promises more competition for the benefit of consumers and, 
on the other hand, gives the companies in the online markets the tools to turn 
the pro-competitive characteristics of the environment into their opposite by 
an easy elimination of price competition to the detriment of consumers. The 
question is whether competition authorities can quickly and correctly disclose 
the misuse of pricing algorithms, whether the current competition law has at 
its disposal enough of efficient tools to protect the positives and offset the neg-
atives of online markets in the digital economy.
To illustrate what has been just said, there is no need to go far. The network of 
shared individual transport, the world-famous Uber, brought revolutionizing 
competition into the world of taxi services, giving the opportunity to improve 
personal budgets to thousands of car owners and gaining fidelity of millions 
of users in large cities around the world. As a proper disruptive technology, 
it posed a challenge to several sectors of traditional business regulation, from 
tax collection, though employee rights to antitrust. Founder of Uber, T. Kala-
nick, has created an algorithm evaluating immediate supply and demand for 
transport, and then changing every five minutes the billed price (depending on 
a specific city zone and possibly other undisclosed factors15). Uber ś algorithm 
then determines the price charged by individual drivers belonging to the net-
work whose members know that a certain percentage of the price set by the 
network is guaranteed to them. 
15  Leber, J. The Secrets of Uber ś Mysterious Seurge Pricing Algorithm Revelaed, Fast Com-
pany Daily Newsletter, October 29, 2015. < https://www.fastcompany.com/3052703/the-se-
crets-of-ubers-mysterious-surge-pricing-algorithm-revealed >, last accessed on 12/12/2017. 
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In the Meyer v. Kalanick litigation16, the founder of Uber defended himself 
by asserting that prices set by the algorithm simply followed “natural market 
fluctuations”. The fact however was that these fluctuations were not perceived 
and evaluated by imperfect human senses and brains but by a refined PC algo-
rithm.17 The resulting price thus was not the result of competitive uncertainty 
but, on the contrary, of the certainty of the drivers driving for Uber that no 
one else in the network would offer another price to the customer. That is why 
Judge Rakoff did not meet Kalanick’s request to reject Meyer’s claim and stat-
ed that Kalanick had created a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, including a vertical 
agreement between the hub (Kalanick-Uber) and spokes (drivers), as well as a 
horizontal agreement between the drivers that consented to would follow the 
conditions set by Uber - all that with the outcome consisting in limitation of 
price competition to the detriment of Uber customers.
4.  TYPOLOGY OF ALGORITHMIC DISTORTION OF 
COMPETITION
The history of misuse of pricing algorithms has already its decided cases, how-
ever those have been so far only cases in which the PC algorithm was merely 
a tool in the hands of undertakings concluding a cartel agreement (or acting 
in concert). In the US, this is the so-called Poster Cartel of D. Topkins and 
several other sellers of posters (whose identity was not revealed).18 They let the 
PC algorithm carry out their agreement to align the prices of posters offered 
through Amazon online sale. In the EU, there is the decision of the Court of 
Justice in the case C-74/14 Eturas.19 Eturas created online booking software 
E-TURAS, which was offered to travel agencies. After certain time, Eturas in-
formed these agencies by e-mail that, in order to “normalize competition”, the 
16  Case 1:15-cv-09796-JSR Meyer v. Kalanick United States District Court Southern District 
of New York, Document 37. For more information see Vegari, A. N.,  Lobue, R. P., District 
Court Finds Uber CEO, by Driving for Uber, May be Liable for Driving Up Prices. Patter-
son Belknap Antitrust Update, April 6, 2016.   <https://www.antitrustupdateblog.com/district-
court-finds-uber-ceo-driving-uber-may-liable-driving-prices/>, last accessed 12/12/2017. 
17  Mehra, S. K., Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms. Min-
nesota Law Review, Vol. 100, 2016 p. 1324.
18  Department of Justice. Press Release Number: 15-421. Former E-Commerce 
Executive Charged with Price Fixing in the Antitrust Division’s First Online Mar-
ketplace Prosecution. April 6, 2015.  <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-com-
merce-executive-charged-price-fixing-antitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace>, 
last accessed on 12/12/2017. 
19  Case C-74/14 “Eturas” UAB and others  v. Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba. 
Judgment of the Court of Justice, January 21, 2016. ECLI:EU:C:2016:42.
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online shared software would limit the maximum level of discounts offered by 
travel agencies to 3%. In essence, this was the analogy of the hub-and-spoke 
“Uber model”: Eturas set the margin of discounts and thus restricted the price 
competition between travel agencies to the detriment of their clients. In the 
proceedings before the Court, it was not that much the substantive law ques-
tion whether the competitive pricing had been distorted, but rather the issue of 
how exactly it had to be proved (the fact of acquaintance with the message) in 
order to establish which travel agencies participated in the cartel which had to 
be clarified. 
Authors such as Ezrachi and Stucke, or the OECD study20, divide these already 
known cases, which do not require any changes to the current EU or US com-
petition law, into two separate types. Poster cartels can be referred to as the 
messenger scenario or alternatively as a misuse of the monitoring algorithm. 
The price-generating algorithm is deliberately misused there by cartelists as a 
means to effectively implement and monitor their collusion. The question for 
the competition authorities may be how to detect the violation, but not its legal 
qualification, as the agreement between undertakings preceded the use of the 
algorithm in clear violation of Art 101 TFEU or Sec 1 of Sherman Act. 
The second relatively simple type of collusion is the hub-and-spoke scenario, 
also described as a misuse of the parallel algorithm. Such an algorithm, often 
created by a third party who does not directly participate in the competition 
on the relevant market, but usually plays the role of sales coordinator for a 
larger number of independent sellers. They either agree to such a coordination, 
or tacitly accept it, i.e. they are supposed know that their behavior is being 
concerted. Disclosure and proof of anticompetitive offense can be a little more 
complicated here because different vertical and horizontal “concertations” are 
combined, and participants may be to a different degree aware of being part 
of a price cartel. Even in this type of cases, however, the algorithm is not more 
than a technical means facilitating an agreement between companies. The cur-
rent antitrust therefore knows how to cope with it. 
To the two following scenarios of distortion of competition the same “simplic-
ity” does not apply, and according to Ezrachi and Stucke, OECD and other au-
thors, the competition law faces because of them the real new challenges. The 
former of the two is referred to as the predictable agent scenario or as a misuse 
of the signalling algorithm. In this type of cases, each undertaking has an in-
dependently selected algorithm that continually monitors and adjusts the price 
20  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
Algorithms and Collusion – Background Note by the Secretariat DAF/COMP(2017)4, June 9, 
2017.
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based on the data obtained from the market. Each of these algorithms per-
sistently and very quickly (using trial and error method) sends to and receives 
signals from the market as long as it finds the temporary optimum - usually 
setting the price higher than the real competition would have kept it. It depends 
a lot on the design of a particular algorithm, whether it is once again “just” 
an automated implementation of the previously reach understanding about the 
alignment of prices, or, on the other hand, a perfect follow-up of a market 
leader, a pure parallelism, without any contact let alone agreements between 
companies. In the world of brick and mortar shops, an independent adaptation 
of individual sellers to market changes or to market leader used to be legal and 
legitimate as without an agreement or exchange of information between under-
taking a cartel could hardly happen.21 This scenario of a collective elimination 
of price competition without committing a cartel deserves more attention and 
will be discussed further.
The latter - fourth - scenario is still a bit of science-fiction from today’s per-
spective. It is the so-called digital eye, or self-learning artificial intelligence, 
with which the algorithm reaches the level of a transition from a perfect instru-
ment to an autonomously deciding entity. It is expected that such algorithms 
will self-refine themselves and set their own strategy, not based on some linear 
sequences of trials and errors, but as a black box that will (like human mind) 
combine complex sets of data in a way that would be difficult to predict.22 A 
preview of this future reality was provided by a PC algorithm called Libratus 
in early 2017. This creation of researchers from Carnegie-Mellon University 
in the US was programmed for games based on incomplete information, such 
as Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold’Em poker, however, not equipped with any 
specific poker game strategy. At the Pennsylvania tournament, Libratus con-
tinued to improve for twenty game days, eventually defeating four world’s best 
poker players. These defeated humans later said that Libratus surprised them 
by the form and variability of his strategy. What human players considered by 
their experience to be a mistake was usually reversed by Libratus in the win-
ning game. The robot was able to learn from his inhuman mistakes well before 
his human opponents were able to reveal them and use them against him. 23
21  For details see the EU Court of Justice decisions  C-199/92 P Hüls AG v. Komise, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:358 and  C-89/, 104, 114, 116, 125, 125, 129/85 Wood Pulp II. 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:120.
22  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
It ś a Feature, not a Bug: On Learning Algorithms and what they teach us – Note by Avigrdor 
Gal. DAF/COMOP/WD(2017)50, June 7, 2017, p. 5.
23  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and Counter-Measures – Note by Ezrachi, A. and Stucke, 
M. E. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)25, May 31, 2017, p. 24. For the report from the tournament see: 
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Libratus and his clones are not yet selling on internet markets today, but it can-
not be ruled out that they will after 2020 and the competition law will have to 
cope with the question of who should be held responsible for price collusions 
that have not been programmed by humans, but the intelligent robots have ad-
opted them on their own without being guided by any person in law.
5. ANTI-COMPETITIVE ALGORITHMIC PARALLELISM - 
OFFENSE AND ITS REMEDY
The third of the above described scenarios of price collusion (predictable 
agent/ signalling algorithm) is now considered by majority of analysts and 
institutions to be the real challenge for competition law. This issue is that the 
classical antitrust, neither in the EU nor in the US, outlaws the unilateral, con-
tactless adaptation to what others are doing. There are no obvious rules that 
could be enforced in situations when PC algorithms, independently of humans, 
suppress price competition in a market.
If members of a narrow oligopoly practice a conscious but non-concerted par-
allelism in pricing, EU competition law could use the institute of collective 
dominance and could, if prices were inflated, sanction it as an abuse under the 
Article 102 TFEU. Criteria of a collective dominance24, cumulatively required 
by the Court of Justice in T-342/99 Airtours 2002 decision25 and subsequently 
clarified in C-413/06 P Sony / BMG 200826, i.e. the transparent, easily mon-
itored market, the existence of a “retaliation” mechanism detaining attempts 
to unilaterally divert from a parallel strategy and the absence of an external 
competitive pressure, seem to correspond to the conditions of pricing through 
PC algorithms used by 3-4 large companies that benefit from networking ef-
fects of the online environment. The abovementioned advantages of the online 
markets are precisely the transparency of market strategies due to the rapid 
Revell, T., AI just won a poker tournament against professional players. New Scientist, January 
31, 2017. < https://www.newscientist.com/article/2119815-ai-just-won-a-poker-tournament-
against-professional-players/ >, last acceessed 12/12/2017. 
24  For an overview of the use of the collective dominance concept see: Petit, N., Neyrinck, N. 
Collective dominance: An overview of national case law. e-Competitions, N° 39129.  <http://
orbi.ulg.be/bitstream/2268/106843/1/Collective%20dominance-%20An%20overview%20
of%20national%20case.pdf >, last accessed 12/12/2017. 
25  Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities. Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance, June 6, 2002. ECLI:EU:T:2002:146.
26  Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music 
Publishers and Labels Association (Impala). Judgment of the Court of Justice, July 10, 2008. 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:392. 
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collecting and processing of large volumes of data, the ability to react quickly 
to changes in competitors’ prices (eliminating the desired effect of any price 
reduction) and therefore also the ability to align prices and maintain them in 
long term. Contrary to that, it is the inherent dynamism of technology driven 
markets that could compromise the use of this concept of EU antitrust as rapid 
innovations, disruptive technologies, shifts in customer preferences etc. make 
online markets rather unstable, subject to continuous change in market shares 
and sometimes also in market leaders. 
In the United States, antitrust regulations do not sanction such parallel behav-
ior, although one of the classics of the Chicago School of antitrust, R. Posner, 
proposed already decades ago to interpret the existence of an agreement (that 
is required for activation of Sec 1 of Sherman Act) so that it would include also 
a strategy shared contactless by members of an oligopoly.27 The US authors 
are now considering also the use of Sec 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act that prohibits unfair competition, which may consist in the fact that the 
company either acquired a certain algorithm with an unfair intention, or at 
least had to know that the algorithm was designed to avoid price competition.28 
A bottleneck here is the need to prove the fault of the company, i.e. the causal 
relationship between the company ś intention or negligence and the negative 
impact of the algorithm on price competition.
But what about the cases that could not be subsumed under the abovementioned 
provisions of EU and US antitrust and the corresponding competition authori-
ties would appear helpless vis-a-vis the artificially high price level maintained 
in the long term? There have been four types of approach proposed so far in 
the running discussion: (i) to refine or extend the interpretation of existing 
competition rules, (ii) to enact new prohibitions, (iii) to use more intensively 
some alternative methods of resolving competition cases; (iv) to act in such a 
way that algorithmic parallelism cannot occur or would be ineffective.
The first approach is based on the premise that these „dangerous“ algorithms 
had to be created and set in motion by someone, so their design and use in 
practice can serve as a link between what is happening in the market and the 
will to collude on the part of the business. It is therefore an extension of the 
concept of the algorithm being a mere instrument in the hands of an undertak-
ing that, sure did not agree on anything precise with his competitors but set up 
27  Mehra, S. K., Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms. Min-
nesota Law Review, Vol. 100, 2016 p. 1343.
28  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
It ś a Feature, not a Bug: On Learning Algorithms and what they teach us – Note by Avigrdor 
Gal. DAF/COMOP/WD(2017)50, June 7, 2017, p. 37.
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his PCs to communicate with PCs used by other undertakings, to monitor and 
follow their prices... and did not equip it with any protection against constant 
price alignments and increases. 
The EU Commissioner for Competition, M. Vestager, seems to prefer just this 
approach by pushing for “compliance by design”.29 Under this concept under-
takings would be held liable for the software used by their PCs that should 
have been programmed in a way to be unable to maintain the price strategy 
shared with competitors. Even at the OECD round table in June 2017 represen-
tatives of some EU member states suggested to interpret the term „concerted 
practice“ widely in order  to include into it the information exchanges between 
competitors’ PC algorithms, i.e. to treat communications via algorithms as 
information exchanges evidencing an illegal concerted practice.30 Such ap-
proach would require from the competition authorities the ability to audit PC 
algorithms used by companies, which implies the access to the data sets with 
which the algorithm works and also to the code defining its task.31 Without a 
well-developed practice it is however difficult to tell what are the „bad“ data 
and tasks assigned to an algorithm and what is the „correct“ brake that should 
have been built in it. 
The second approach proposing big or small legal changes ranges from minor 
interventions, such as prohibiting automatic price adjustment more than once ev-
ery 24 hours, to expanding the traditional duo of major antitrust offenses (cartels 
and abuse of dominant position / monopoly) of a new offense that could be the 
abuse of excessive market transparency or simply the anti-competitive algorith-
mic parallelism as a type of behavior different from the permissible “normal” 
conscious parallelism (market adaptation).32 Larger extremes - prohibiting pric-
ing algorithms as such - no one seriously suggests because everybody is aware of 
their contribution to efficiency and consumer awareness, as well as of the vanity 
of barring the implementation of new technical gadgets. 
29  Vestager, M., Algorithms and competition. Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Compe-
tition, Berlin, 16 March 2017  <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/ve-
stager/announcements/bundeskartellamt-18th-conference-competition-berlin-16-march-2017_
en>, last accessed on 12/12/2017. 
30  Modrall, J., OECD Workshop Addresses Algorithms and Collusion Issues, Kluwer 
Competition Law Blog, July 17 2017. < http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.
com/2017/07/17/oecd-workshop-addresses-algorithms-collusion-issues/>, last accessed on 
12/12/2017. 
31  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
It ś a Feature, not a Bug: On Learning Algorithms and what they teach us – Note by Avigrdor 
Gal. DAF/COMOP/WD(2017)50, June 7, 2017, p. 6.
32  See for instance: Dylan, I, Ballard, S. N., Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, and joint 
Conduct. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, May 2017.
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Future legal innovations could also solidify and extend the changes that the 
abovementioned first approach wants to achieve through interpretation: to en-
act the strict corporate liability for the algorithms used, or the liability of the 
person who profits the most of the risk the algorithm has created, or alterna-
tively of the person who could reduce the risk presented by the algorithm (i.e. 
not only the undertaking – operator of the problematic algorithm but also the 
undertaking – maker of the algorithm). These options are presented by the 
European Commission to discussion about the models of responsibility in the 
context of the digital economy in general.33 According to observers, there is 
currently more firmness on the part of the EU than on the US side34, in an at-
tempt to find a way to make companies objectively responsible for their robots 
even in the absence of any indication of their will to commit a cartel.35
A similar strictness appears to be already written into the Australian Competi-
tion and Consumer Act of 2010, according to Sec 46 of which, no proof of the 
“meeting of minds” is required to ensure that companies benefiting from collu-
sion are sanctioned for harm to competition. Commentators say that thanks to 
this, under Australian law, companies that have benefited from the algorithmic 
pricing, even from the artificial intelligence mechanisms, they have deployed, 
can be held responsible, whether or not there was an agreement or the intention 
to collude.36
Intensive use of alternative methods – the third approach of competition au-
thorities - means to talk more often with businesses, to conduct more sectoral 
investigations, to disseminate exemplary harmless parameters of algorithms 
tested in public algorithms´ incubators, to accept voluntary codes of conduct, 
to recommend codes of conduct on online markets, etc. The limits of the 
broadly conceived competition advocacy are wide open, and the myriad of 
proposals transgress into the fourth group of measures, would rather bet on 
the prevention of algorithmic parallelism. Here, firstly, it should be possible 
to limit the emergence of oligopolistic markets. This can be done by stricter 
merger and takeover assessments in the IT sector, by encouraging start-up 
33  Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the 
European data economy Accompanying the document Communication Building a European 
data economy. SWD/2017/02 final, Brussels, 10. 1. 2017.
34  Nylen, L., Newman, M., Views on algorithms and competition law expose EU-US divide. 
MLex Market Insight, May 26, 2017.
35  Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. Pricing Algorithms: the digital collusions scenarios. 
2017. < ttps://www.freshfields.com/globalassets/our-thinking/campaigns/digital/mediainter-
net/pdf/freshfields-digital---pricing-algorithms---the-digital-collusion-scenarios.pdf >, last 
accessed on 12/12/2017. 
36  Panichi, J., Seers, P., Newman, M.. Australia reckons it ś ready to fight algorithmic collu-
sion as world scramble to review. MLexInsight, November 21, 2017. 
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developers of “disruptive” technologies or pro-consumer algorithms that will 
detect offers not following the existing price collusion etc. There is no doubt 
that many of these measures that are generally available without the difficult 
search for a consensus on changes in the laws will see the light very soon. For 
example, the Korean Competition Authority already uses a PC algorithm to 
scan the parameters of public tenders and search for bid-rigging indicators, i.e. 
of the secret alignment of bids in public tenders.37
6. ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONSPIRACY OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE
The above-mentioned case of the Libratus game robot suggests that in the fore-
seeable future we will also encounter more sophisticated algorithms, which 
led by the general order “to make profit at the end of the specified period of 
trading”, will develop their own hard-to-analyze strategies. They may include 
the ability to overcome the restrictions introduced by their law-obeying own-
ers, or even the „smartness“ to avoid switching-off or blocking - deployed with 
all the intelligence of the beings struggling to survive. Artificial intelligence 
experts are already warning that programming such robots in accordance with 
(effectively interpreted) Asimov ś three laws of robotics38 will be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, because we can translate into the code only unam-
biguous definitions which, however, we do not have for value-burdened con-
cepts like public good, morality, justice, fairness, general welfare, etc.39
The European Parliament is already seriously debating whether to create a 
separate category of persons in law for advanced artificial intelligence.40 This 
37  OECD Directorate General for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. 
Algorithms and Collusion – Background Note by the Secretariat DAF/COMP(2017)4, June 9, 
2017, p. 11. 
38  Three laws of robotics devised by the world-known sci-fi writer Isaac Asimov: 1) A robot 
may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2) A 
robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict 
with the First Law. 3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does 
not conflict with the First or Second Laws. See for instance at: < https://www.auburn.edu/~-
vestmon/robotics.html >, last accessed on 12/12/2017. These law are referred to also by the 
European Parliament: Committee of Legal Affairs Draft Report with recommendation to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2013(INL)), p. 4. 
39  Umělá inteligence tiká jako bomba (AI is like a ticking bomb), interview of P. Houda with 
s N. Bostrom in Lidové noviny  - Česká pozice 25. 6. 2017. < https://www.pressreader.com/
czech-republic/lidove-noviny/20170624/281513636157560 >, last accessed on 12/12/2017. 
40  European Parliament. Committee of Legal Affairs DRAFT REPORT with recommenda-
tion to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2013(INL)). 
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is only a step away from what was proposed by S. K. Mehra in his widely cited 
study of 201641: we must decide to hold responsible either the robots them-
selves or the companies using them (because the alternative of irresponsibility 
is unacceptable). At this point, a legal and philosophical dispute may open 
about the existence of freewill in our determined world and whether this use-
ful fiction should be extended to the advanced artificial intelligence. Shortly 
after, we will have to decide on the type of sanction to be inflicted on robots 
for their law-breaching behavior. Even if we postpone this debate as largely 
premature for today, it is already possible to formulate - from the competition 
law angle - some starting points of future answers.
A smart robot, as proposed by MEPs, will have to be a registered and insured 
entity. This individualization of robots and also the responsibility that the op-
erator will have vis-a-vis his self-learning robot, make it possible to look for 
parallels between the responsibility of the company for its employees and for 
its robots. It is already well established that employers must train and control 
their employees also in terms of competition protection (well-known antitrust 
compliance programs). They will have to deal with the robots in the same 
way as with the employees, because the employers´ responsibility for their 
anti-competitive behavior cannot be but similar. The insertion of competition 
protecting orders in the robot code will be an attenuating circumstance in the 
eyes of the competition authority, just like the situation when a „good“ robot is 
seduced to a cartel by a competitor’s employee (or robot). 
Paradoxically then, the use of current competition law concepts can be made 
easier by the fiction of the robot’s freewill and of its legally significant mani-
festation than in the case of the present algorithmic parallelism. Nowadays, as 
outlined above, the algorithm does not have a separate will, while the company 
may not manifest its own will either, so it is necessary to think about how to 
re-interpret or change the current competition rules so that an automated re-
sult, destructive for competition, can be banned. The analogy between the AI 
entity and the employee of a company, held equally responsible for both, could 
make this ban straightforward and undisputable. And until the moment when 
the laws in force would allow smart robots to run their separate business, or 
to start a company without the participation of natural or legal persons, this 
analogy could work well enough. After that moment we will have to have thor-
oughly thought out whether we would somehow fine the robots, or temporarily 
disconnect them from the network, or eventually send them to the shredder.
41  Mehra, S. K., Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms. Min-
nesota Law Review, Vol. 100, 2016 p. 1323-1375.
Intereulaweast, Vol. IV (2) 2017
16
7. CONCLUSION
The discussion about influence of PC algorithms on the theory and practice 
of competition (anti-cartel) law has its practical justification. Already today, 
in addition to cases where algorithms are used only to better implement a 
deal or concerted practice agreed between undertakings, possible cases of 
so-called algorithmic price parallelism occur. They look like a market fol-
low-up strategy or a conscious parallelism through individual adaptation that 
current competition law does not prohibit either in the EU or in the US, except 
in the rare cases of a so-called abuse of collective dominant position in EU 
law. With introduction of modern pricing algorithms, however, the same type 
of parallel or follow-up behavior can be fatal for price competition in online 
markets. PC algorithms enable the processing of such a volume of data, plus 
a very quick and lasting, non-emotional reaction, that the underlying assump-
tions on which competition protection has so far been built cease to work. 
Transparency of markets ceases to foster competition, the prisoner dilemma 
produces a different outcome, and the market can be riddled of price compe-
tition without any hint of contact or agreement that is currently considered as 
prerequisite to a cartel.
The possibility of suppressing price competition in online trading markets 
cannot but provoke a reaction of the current competition law. We can expect 
a wide range of measures, of which, apparently, only the last in a row will 
be the addition of a new type of offense to a classic set of delicts against free 
and undistorted competition. A more likely solution would be to construe 
the liability for anticompetitive offense as a strict one as an absolute respon-
sibility for the design or use of an algorithm (of course, together with many 
sub-measures that will allow to better detect or prevent the algorithmic price 
parallelism by working upon the parameters and processes of the market as 
a whole). 
Such changes and measures will not yet take the PC algorithm for an inde-
pendent smart robot, a deep learning artificial intelligence that would choose 
autonomously (as if of its own will) its market behavior. However, this sci-
ence-fiction option is already being discussed as a not that distant future to 
which our society, our markets and our law would enter within one to two 
decades. In this perspective, it will be necessary to look for parallels first be-
tween the robot and the employee and thus consider the responsibility of the 
employer-undertaking for their acts against competition. In a slightly farther 
future, the existence of smart robots as independent entrepreneurs or founders 
and business owners cannot be ruled out – together with their tendency to an 
anti-competitive behavior that would be evaluated by them as profitable.
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